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Summary
This thesis focuses on the existence of competitive equilibria in a large market
and on the existence of Nash equilibrium in a large game.
The new results of this thesis are presented in Chapters 3 and 4.
In Chapter 1, we introduce the background of this thesis and review some pre-
liminary knowledge in economics. Here we also discuss briefly the main results of
this thesis.
Chapter 2 contains some mathematical preliminaries and a few theorems to be
used in Chapters 3 and 4.
In Chapter 3, we provide the proof of the existence of competitive equilibrium
in asymmetric information economies with indivisible goods satisfying incentive
compatibility. The result extends some corresponding results of [33] for economies
with perfectly divisible goods to the case of indivisible goods.
vi
Summary vii
In Chapter 4, we introduce some basic elements of game theory, and prove the
existence of equilibrium of large games with transformed summary statistics. That






1.1 Background of Asymmetric Information
It is of interest to ask whether an economic system is producing an ‘optimal’
economic outcome. An essential requirement for any optimal economic allocation
is that it possesses the property of pareto optimality.
An allocation is pareto optimal if it uses society’s initial resources and tech-
nological possibilities efficiently in the sense that there is no alternative way to
organize the production and distribution of goods that makes some consumers
better off without making some other consumers worse off.
Pareto optimality serves as an important minimal test for the desirability of an
allocation. This concept is a formalization of the idea that there is no waste in the
allocation of resources in society.
In our real life, it seems that most economic situation involves some asymmetric
information. All the agents probably know something about their own utility or
technology of production that is not known to all other agents. Hence, it follows
that in most economic problems, there does not exist Pareto efficient outcome due
to the asymmetric information. The classical Arrow-Debreu-Mckenzie model of
1
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perfect competition implies that individuals can exercise some influence on the
prices at which goods are either sold or bought in the economy. In recent years,
lots of research has been showing the various ways that asymmetric information
among agents in an economy can prevent us from the attainment of a Pareto
efficient outcome.
Nowadays, in spite of the possible omnipresence of this asymmetric information
induced inefficiency, many economists have interest in the markers with asymmet-
ric information among agents, and believe that in many conditions, competitive
markets generate efficiency. A heuristic way to capture the idea is that there should
be a concept of an agent’s being informationally small, and the inefficiency due to
asymmetric information is small when agents are informationally small. But it is
difficult to measure the informational smallness. When it is appropriate, we shall
use the terminologies of private information, differential information, incomplete
information and asymmetric information interchangeably.
Aumann [3] introduced an economy with an atomless measure space of agents.
In such an economy, each individual agent has non-negligible consumption in gen-
eral, but with negligible impact on the aggregate demand, then takes the price as
given. Hence, the formulation of an atomless measure space of agents captures
precisely the meaning of perfect competition.1
But in the Aumann model, each agent’s characteristics are non-random. Thus,
contracts (trades) are made under complete information. It is an attractive idea
whether one can introduce asymmetric or private information on the Aumann
economy, and still can capture the meaning of perfect competition. We may find
when we introduce private information in the Aumann model, it is possible for
agents to have monopoly power on their information, and thus they may have an
incentive to manipulate their information to become better off.
1See [11] for a systematic development of large economies and extensive references.
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As we all know, the conflict between Pareto efficiency and incentive compat-
ibility is a popular topic in economics and game theory. The issues associated
with this conflict are particularly important in the design of resource allocation
mechanisms in the presence of asymmetrically informed agents where the need to
acquire information from agents in order to compute efficient outcomes and the in-
centives agents have to misrepresent that information for personal gain come into
conflict. Our intuition tells us that a perfectly competitive market should still have
efficiency since no single agent has monopoly power on information. Therefore, we
have the following question: can one model the idea of perfect competition in an
economy with asymmetric information or with negligible private information?
Gul-Postlewaite [10] and McLean-Postlewaite [19] formalize informational size
in a way that one can ignore the incentive issues associated with asymmetric in-
formation when agents are informationally small. They model the intuitive idea as
independent replicas of a fixed differential information economy with finitely many
agents and prove the consistency of incentive compatibility and efficiency in an
approximate sense. In this approach, the influence of an individual agent’s infor-
mation disappear gradually when the number of agents goes to infinity, but private
information is not becoming more accurate. In a way, the models in [10] and [19]
can be considered as capturing the idea of approximate perfect competition in a
differential information economy.
Sun and Yannelis [33] formulate precisely the idea of perfect competition for
a differential information economy, and generalize the Aumann model. What’s
more important is that the conflict between incentive compatibility and Pareto
efficiency can be resolved perfectly in Sun and Yannelis model. The proofs of the
exact results in [33] are much more simple and transparent in measure-theoretic
terms than the approximate ones in [10] and [19].
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1.2 Historical Backgrounds of Game theory
Game theory is concerned with the actions of individuals who are conscious that
their actions affect each other, which is the study of multi-persons’ decision prob-
lems.
Nash equilibrium is without a doubt the most successful solution concepts for
games, which is widely used and applied. It touches almost every area of economic
theory, as well as social choice, politics and many other areas of application. Within
game theory itself it engenders a host of relationships. Basically a non-cooperative
concept, it has nevertheless been applied with considerable success to cooperative
models.
In 1973, Schmeidler stated that a Nash equilibrium in the form of pure strategies
exists in a game with an atomless space of players and finite actions, provided
that the payoffs are restricted to depend only on the average responses of others.
Atomless measure spaces have found application in non-cooperative game theory.
Rath [24] restricts the analysis to pure strategies. He gives a direct and much
simpler proof of the existence of pure strategy nash equilibria in games with a
continuum of players and in the case where the space of actions is a compact subset
of n dimensional Euclidean space. The counterexample in Khan, Rath, and Sun
[13] shows that these results do not extend to general infinite-dimensional action
spaces for Lebesgue measure spaces of players. Khan and Sun [14] argue that such
an extension can be achieved if the space of players is an atomless hyperfinite Loeb
measure space. These results also furnish approximate results for the case where
the number of players is large but finite.
On the other hand, there is a continuum of small players whose payoffs depend
on summary statistics of the aggregate strategy profile in many applied game-
theoretic models. In 2003, Rauh showed that a static non-cooperative game with a
continuum of small players, whose payoffs depend on their own actions and finitely
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many summary statistics of the aggregate profiles, has an equilibrium in pure
strategies. However, the strategy set and the summary statistics of the aggregate
have some restrictions.
1.3 Main Results
Now we shall address on the contents of this thesis. In our real life, most of
our consumption goods is indivisible (house, computer, etc), and only little is
divisible (money, gold, etc). In the models of [33], Sun and Yannelis consider only
divisible consumption bundles. Now, a purpose of this thesis is to study perfect
competition for an economy with indivisible and divisible goods. We will consider
in this thesis consumption bundles which consist of quantities for m− 1 indivisible
and 1 divisible goods. Mas-Colell [17] shows that with a suitable dispersedness
assumption on a divisible commodity together with another special condition on
the desirability of the divisible good, the main results on deterministic measure-
theoretic economies with divisible commodities remain valid for economies with
indivisible commodities. Based on the main results in [17], we follow the methods
developed in [33] to prove the existence of competitive equilibrium in asymmetric
information economies with indivisible goods.
In chapter 4 of this paper, we introduce some model in game theory. The play-
ers’ payoffs depend on their own actions and the mean of the strategy profiles
under a general transformation. The existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium
is then shown. Our result covers the case when the payoffs depend on players’
own actions and finitely many summary statistics as considered in Rauh [27]. It
is more general than that of Rauh [27] in several aspects. First, our action space
is a general compact metric space while the formulation in Rauh [27] requires the
action space to be a compact set in a finite dimensional space. Second, we work
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with a general transformation rather than the special functions obtained by taking
the composition of some univariate vector functions with projections. Third, we do
not need the unnatural assumption on the strict monotonicity of some component
of the univariate vector functions as in Rauh [27]. A paper on this work is jointly
written with Yu Haomiao, which has been accepted by the Economy Theory.
The existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is shown in Rath [24] for large
games with a compact action space in a finite dimensional space, where the payoffs
depend on players’ own actions and the mean of the aggregate strategy profiles.
This result does not extend to infinite-dimensional spaces (see Khan, Rath and Sun
[13]) when the unit interval with Lebesgue measure is used to represent the space
of players; such an extension is possible if the space of players is an atomless hyper-
finite Loeb measure space (see Khan and Sun [12]). It is claimed in Rauh [27] that
“All these results involve the mean and hence do not apply to monopolistic compe-
tition models with summary statistics different from the mean or several summary
statistics”. However, our formulation shows that monopolistic competition models
can indeed be studied via the mean under some transformation.
Chapter 2
Mathematical Background
The main purpose of this chapter is to review some mathematical preliminaries
which we will need in Chapters 3 and 4 later. After giving some notations and
definitions, we will provide some basic theorems needed in this thesis.1
2.1 Mathematical Preliminaries
2.1.1 Notation
Rn denotes the n−fold Cartesian product of the set of real numbers R.
Z+ denotes the set of non-negative integers.
Z++ denotes the set of positive integers.
R+ denotes the set of non-negative real numbers.
R++ denotes the set of positive real numbers.
B(x, ε) denotes the open ball centered at x of radius ε.
proj denotes projection.
∅ denotes the empty set.
⊗ denotes product σ−algebra.
1In this thesis, we keep the same notations and definitions as [33] for convenience.
7
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£ denotes rich product σ−algebra.
P S denotes marginal probability measures of P respectively on (S,S).
2.1.2 Some Basic Definitions
Definition 2.1.1. For a given signed measure µ, a measurable set S is a null set if
µ(S ′) = 0 for every measurable S ′ ⊂ S. An atom of the measure µ is a measurable
non-null set S such that, for every measurable S ′ ⊂ S we have S ′ is a null set or
µ(S ′) = µ(S). If the measure µ has no atom, it is said to be atomless.
In order to deal with independent processes, we need to use an extension of
the usual measure-theoretic product having the Fubini property. Here is a formal
definition.
Definition 2.1.2. Let (I, I, λ) and (Ω,F , P ) be probability spaces. A probability
space (I × Ω,W , Q) is said to be a Fubini extension of the usual product space
(I × Ω, I ⊗ F , λ ⊗ P ) if it is an extension of (I × Ω, I ⊗ F , λ ⊗ P ), and for any
real-valued Q-integrable function g on (I × Ω,W), the two functions gi = g(i, ·)
and gω = f(·, ω) are integrable respectively on (Ω,F , P ) for λ-almost all i ∈ I and




















dP . The space (I × Ω,W , Q) is denoted by (I × Ω, I £ F , λ£ P ).
We shall introduce the following independence condition. We state the def-
inition using a complete separable metric space X for the sake of generality; in
particular, a finite space or an Euclidean space is a complete separable metric
space.
Definition 2.1.3. A process G from I×T to a complete separable metric space X
is said to be essentially pairwise independent conditioned on the true state random
variable s˜ if
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1. G is I £ T -measurable;
2. for each s ∈ S, the random variables Gi from (T, T , P Ts ) to X are essentially
pairwise independent in the sense that for λ-almost all i ∈ I, Gi and Gj are
independent for λ-almost all j ∈ I.
Now we are about to present the basic measure-theoretic framework in our
economic models.
Let an atomless probability space (I, I, λ) represent the space of economic
agents. We can also take I to be the unit interval for simplicity. Let S =
{s1, s2, . . . , sK} be the space of true states of nature (its power set denoted by
S), which is not known to agents. Let T 0 = {q1, q2, . . . , qL} represent the space
of all the possible signals (types) for individual agents, (T, T ) a measurable space,
which model the private signal profiles for all the agents, and thus T is a space of
functions from I to T 0.2 Therefore, t ∈ T , as a function from I to T 0, represents
a private signal profile for all agents in I. For agent i ∈ I, t(i) (also denoted by
ti) is the private signal of agent i, and t−i represents the restriction of the signal
profile t to the set I \ {i} of agents different from i; let T−i be the set of all such
t−i. For simplicity, we shall assume that (T, T ) has a product structure so that T
is a product of T−i and T 0, while T is the product algebra of the power set T 0 on
T 0 with a σ-algebra T−i on T−i. We shall use the usual notation (t−i, t′i) to denote
the signal profile whose value is t′i for agent i (t
′
i ∈ T 0), and the same as t for other
agents.
We fix a probability space (Ω,F , P ) representing all the uncertainty on the
true states as well as on the signals for all the agents, where (Ω,F) is the product
measurable space (S × T,S ⊗ T ). Let s˜ and t˜i, i ∈ I be the respective projection
2In the literature, one usually assumes that different agents have possibly different sets of
signals and require that the agents take all their own signals with positive probability. For nota-
tional simplicity, we choose to work with a common set T 0 of signals, but allow zero probability
for some of the signals. There is no loss of generality in this latter approach.
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mappings from Ω to S and from Ω to T 0 with t˜i(s, t) = ti.
3 Without loss of
generality, for each true state s ∈ S, we assume that the state is essential in
the sense that pis = P
S({s}) > 0; let P Ts be the conditional probability measure
on (T, T ) when the random variable s˜ takes value s. Thus, for each B ∈ T ,




s . Note that the
conditional probability measure P Ts is often denoted as P (·|s) in the literature.
We can also introduce the conditional probability measure4 P S(·|t) on S such
that P S({s}|t) forms a probability in s ∈ S for a fixed t ∈ T , is T -measurable in
t ∈ T for a fixed s ∈ S, and for each B ∈ T , P ({s}×B) = ∫
B
P S({s}|t)dP T (t). Let
ps(·) be the density function of P Ts with respect to P T . By Radom-Nykodym, we












P S({s}|t)dP T (t); it is easy to see that P S({s}|t) = pisps(t)
for P T -almost all t ∈ T .
For i ∈ I, let τi represent the signal distribution of agent i on the space T 0.5
When the signal of agent i is ti ∈ T 0, P S×T−i(·|ti) is the conditional probability
measure on the product measurable space (S×T−i,S ⊗T−i) . If τi({ti}) > 0, then
it is clear that for D ∈ S ⊗ T−i, P S×T−i(D|ti) = P (D × {ti})/τi({ti}).
In order to work with a signal process that is independent conditioned on
the true states s ∈ S , we need to work with a joint agent-probability space
(I × T, I £ T , λ£ P Ts ) that is a Fubini extension of I ⊗ T .
Let I £ F be the collection of all subsets E of I × Ω such that there are sets
A ∈ I £ T , C ∈ S such that E = {(i, s, t) ∈ I ×Ω : (i, t) ∈ A, s ∈ C}. By abusing
the notation, we can denote E by A×C and I £F by (I £ T )⊗S. Define λ£P
on I £ F by letting λ £ P (A × C) = ∑s∈C pisλ £ P Ts (A). Thus, one can view
λ£ P Ts as the conditional probability measure on I × T , given s˜ = s.
3t˜i can also be viewed as a projection from T to T 0.
4Note that a conditional probability measure is uniquely defined up to a null set.
5For q ∈ T 0, τi({q}) is the probability P (t˜i = q).
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Now we introduce some definitions which we will use in game theory.
Definition 2.1.4. Let X and Y be sets. A correspondence φ from X into Y
assigns to each x in X a subset φ(x) of Y . Let φ : X ³ Y 6 be a correspondence.
The graph of φ is denoted by Gφ = {(x, y) ∈ X × Y : y ∈ φ(x)}.
A correspondence is a set-valued function, which associates to each point in
one set a set of points in another set.
Just as functions have inverses, each correspondence φ : X ³ 2Y has two
natural inverses:
(1) the upper inverse φu defined by φu(A) = {x ∈ X : φ(x) ⊆ A};
(2) the lower inverse φl defined by φl(A) = {x ∈ X : φ(x)⋂A 6= ∅}.
Definition 2.1.5. A correspondence φ : X ³ Y between topological spaces is:
(1) upper hemicontinuous(or, upper semicontinuous) at the point x if for every
open neighborhood U of φ(x), the upper inverse image φu(U) is a neighborhood of
x ∈ X.
(2) lower hemicontinuous(or, lower semicontinuous) at the point x if for every
open set U satisfying φ(x)
⋂
U 6= ∅, the lower inverse image φl(U) is a neighbor-
hood of x.
(3) continuous if φ is both upper and lower hemicontinuous.
Next, we provide the definition of measurable correspondences, which plays an
important role in game theory.
Definition 2.1.6. Let (S,Σ) be a measurable space and X a toplogical space
(usually metrizable). A correspondence φ : S ³ X is:
(1) weakly measurable if φl(G) ∈ Σ for each open subset G of X.
(2) measurable if φl(F ) ∈ Σ for each closed subset F of X.
6φ can also be viewed as a function from X into the power set 2Y of Y . For this reason, we
also denote a correspondence from X to Y as φ : X → 2Y . Also, here we note that in this thesis
we use notation “³” instead of notation “→” to differ correspondences with common functions.
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Commonly, let (T, τ, µ) be a complete, finite measure space, and X be a sep-
arable Banach space. We say the correspondence φ : X → 2Y has a measurable
graph if Gφ ∈ τ ⊗ β(X), where β(X) denotes the Borel σ−algebra on X.
After giving these definitions of correspondence, we would also like to introduce
the definition of selector (or, selection) of a correspondence. A selector from a
relation R ⊂ X × Y is a subset S of Y such that for every x ∈ X, there exists a
unique yx ∈ S satisfying (x, yx) ∈ R.
Definition 2.1.7. A selector from a correspondence φ : X ³ Y is a function
f : X → Y that satisfies f(x) ∈ φ(x) for each x ∈ X.
Another important definition related to the game we discuss here is the concept
of fixed-point. It is Nash who first uses fixed-point theorem to prove the existence
of equilibrium in the game. We shall follow Nash’s steps to use it to prove the
existence of an equilibrium of a best-reply correspondence.
Definition 2.1.8. Let A be subset of a set X. The point x in A is called a
fixed point of a function f : A → X if f(x) = x. Similarly, A fixed point of a
correspondence φ : A³ X is a point x in A satisfying x ∈ φ(x).
2.2 Some Useful Properties
The following theorem and corollary are an exact law of large numbers for a con-
tinuum of independent random variables shown in [31] and [34], which are stated
here using our notations.
Theorem 2.2.1. Let G be a process from Fubini extension (I × T, I £ T , λ£P Ts )
to a Polish space X. Then the following are equivalent.
(1) The random variables Gi are essentially pairwise independent.
(2) For any set A ∈ I with λ(A) > 0, the sample distribution λ(GAt )−1 is the
same as the distribution (λA £ P Ts )(GA)−1 of the process GA for P Ts -almost all
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t ∈ T , where GA is the restriction of G to A × Ω, and λA and (λA £ P Ts ) the
probability measures on A and A× Ω rescaled from λ and (λ£ P Ts ) respectively.
Proof : For (1) =⇒ (2), we only consider the case A = I for notational simplicity.
Fix a countable open base {On}∞n=1 for X so that it is closed under finite intersec-
tions. By the independence assumption, the random variables (1G−1(On))i in the
process 1G−1(On) are essentially uncorrelated, where 1D denotes the indicator func-
tion of the set D in some space. There is a P Ts -null set Kn such that for any t /∈ Kn,
Gt is I-measurable and λ(G−1t (On)) = (λ £ P Ts )(G−1(On)).(See Proposition 3.3,
Sun [34]) Let K be the union of all the Kn. Then K is still a P
T
s -null set.
For each t ∈ T , let µt be the distribution of the sample function Gt (which
exists almost surely by the Fubini property). The distribution of G as a random
variable is denoted by µ. Then, for any t /∈ K,
µt(On) = λ(G
−1
t (On)) = (λ£ P Tk )(G−1(On)) = µ(On)
for all n ≥ 1. Since the class of all the On generates the Borel algebra, and is also
closed under finite intersections, i.e., a pi-system, it follows from the result on the
uniqueness of measures (see [7], p. 45) that µt = µ for any t /∈ K.
Next, we consider (2) =⇒ (1). Fix m,n ≥ 1.Let A,B ∈ I, and take g =





















(ii) implies that the right-hand side of Equation (2.2.1) is zero. By the arbitrary
choice of A and B, we can claim that for λ-almost all k ∈ I, gk is orthogonal to hi
for λ-almost all i ∈ I. This means that for λ-almost all k ∈ I, λ-almost all i ∈ I,∫
T
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Thus, there is a set N such that Equation (2.2.2) holds for all (k, i) /∈ N , and
λ-almost all k ∈ I, the set Nk is a λ-null set. By grouping countably many such
sets together, there exists a set N ′ such that the set N ′k is a λ-null set, and
P Ts (G
−1
k (Om) ∩G−1i (On)) = P Ts (G−1k (Om)) · P Ts (G−1i (On))
holds for all (k, i) /∈ N ′, and for all m,n ≥ 1. Thus, for each (k, i) /∈ N ′, the joint
distribution P Ts (Gk, Gi)
−1 agrees with the product of its marginals on a pi-system
{Om × On : m,n ≥ 1} for X ×X. Hence, P Ts (Gk, Gi)−1 = P Ts G−1k ⊗ P Ts G−1i by a
result on the uniqueness of measures (see [7], p. 45). This means that Gk and Gi
are independent for all (k, i) /∈ N ′. 2
From above theorem, it is obvious to get following corollary.
Corollary 2.2.2. If a process G from I × T to a complete separable metric space
X is essentially pairwise independent conditioned on s˜, then for each s ∈ S, the
cross-sectional distribution λG−1t of the sample function Gt(·) = G(t, ·) is the same
as the distribution (λ £ P Ts )G−1 of the process G viewed as a random variable on
(I × T, I £ T , λ£ P Ts ) for P Ts -almost all t ∈ T .
Next we shall present some known results in game theory. For the purpose of
readability, we only present some classical results which we will use later without
detail proofs here. As for the proofs, one can refer any related book(see, for
example, [1]).
Viewing relations as correspondences, we know that only nonempty-valued cor-
respondences can admit selectors, and nonempty-valued correspondences always
admit selectors. A measurable selector from a correspondence φ : S ³ X between
measurable spaces is a measurable function f : S ∈ X satisfying f(s) ∈ φ(s). We
now introduce the main selection theorem for measurable correspondences.
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Theorem 2.2.3. (Kuratowski-Ryll-Nardzewski Selection Theorem) A weakly mea-
surable correspondence with nonempty closed values form a measurable space into
a Polish space admits a measurable selector.
When we want to prove the existence of equilibrium, one of the most common
ways is to use fixed-point theorems. Along with the development of game theory,
many versions of fixed-point theorems have been used. The Brouwer fixed-point
theorem is used by Von Neumann to prove the basic theorem in the theory of
zero-sum, two-person games; Nash uses Kakutani fixed-point theorem to prove the
existence of so called Nash equilibrium.7 In some infinite dimensional cases, we
may refer to Fan-Glicksberg fixed-point theorem to prove needed existence results.8
So, we would like to end this chapter with the following fixed-point theorem, which
we will use in our theorem in this thesis.
Theorem 2.2.4. (Kakutani Fixed-point Theorem) Let X be a closed, bounded,
convex set in the real N−dimensional space RN . Assume that the correspondence
φ : X ³ X is upper semicontinuous and has nonempty convex values. Then the
set of fixed points of φ is nonempty, that is, there exists some point x∗ ∈ φ(x∗).
7One can refer to Nash [21].





3.1 Perfect Competition in a Large Economy with
Asymmetric Information
We shall use an atomless measure space as the the space of agents. The elementary
idea of perfect competition is that although there are many agents in the economy,
each individual agent has negligible influence in the market. Generally speaking,
each individual agent has non-negligible consumption, however, her share of con-
sumption in the aggregate in terms of per capita consumption is negligible; that
property can be guaranteed when we use an atomless measure space.
When individuals have asymmetric information, an intuitive method to capture
the idea of perfect competition is that the private signal of an individual agent can
only influence a negligible set of agents, and what’s more, those signals associated
with the individual agents that play a particular role in the model (for example,
16
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used in the utility functions or in calculating the aggregate signal distribution in
some sense) are essentially independent of each other. The following definition
formalizes such idea.
Definition 3.1.1. Let G0 be a finite set {g1, g2, . . . , gM}, (with power set G0), and
F be a measurable process from (I × T, I £ T ) to G0. For agent i ∈ I, F (i, t) is
the derived signal of agent i from the signal profile t. The process F is called an
idiosyncratic signal process if it has the following two properties.
(1) The process F is a signal process with negligible influence from private
signals. That is, for λ-almost all i ∈ I, there is a set Ai ∈ I with λ(Ai) = 1 such
that for any t ∈ T and t′i ∈ T 0, F (j, (t−i, ti)) = F (j, (t−i, t′i)) holds for each j ∈ Ai.
(2) The process F is essentially pairwise independent conditioned on s˜.
Notice that ti is the private signal of agent i, and we can call F (i, t) her signal
for simplicity.
From above definition, we can get useful information as follows.
(1) Agent i’s private signal ti can only possibly influence the value of F (j, t)
for a null set of agents j ∈ I −Ai. Thus, whenever agent i mis-reports her private
signal ti has no effect on F (j, t) for almost all agents j ∈ I.
(2) When a true state s is realized, agent i’s derived signal F (i, ·) is independent
of agent j’s derived signal F (j, ·) for almost all agents i, j ∈ I.
When the true state is s, the signal distribution of agent i conditioned on the
true state is P Ts F
−1
i , i.e., the probability for agent i to have gl as her signal is
P Ts (F
−1
i ({gl})) for each 1 ≤ l ≤ M , where Fi = F (i, ·). Let µs be the agents’














Where 1{gl} is the indicator function of the singleton set {gl}. By the Fubini
property for (I × T, I £ T , λ£P Ts ), µs is actually the distribution (λ£P Ts )F−1 of
F , viewed as a random variable on the product space I × T .
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We shall impose the following non-triviality assumption on the process F :
∀s, s′ ∈ S, s 6= s′ ⇒ µs 6= µs′ . (3.1.1)
This means that different true states of nature correspond to different average
conditional distributions of agents’ signals. This assumption is intuitive. It corre-
sponds to the non-triviality condition in [10] and [19] for the independent replica
models.1
The following sets should be introduced.
∀s ∈ S, Ls = {t ∈ T : λF−1t = µs}; L0 = T − ∪s∈SLs. (3.1.2)
The non-triviality assumption implies that for any s, s′ ∈ S with s 6= s′, Ls∩Ls′ =
∅. The measurability of the sets Ls, s ∈ S and L0 follows from the measurability
of F . Thus, the collection {L0} ∪ {Ls, s ∈ S} forms a measurable partition of T .
That partition will play an important role in the following sections.
3.2 Economies with Common Values
3.2.1 A Large Deterministic Economy
Let E0 be a large deterministic economy with the atomless probability space (I, I, λ)
as the space of agents and Zm−1+ ×R+ as the common consumption set. Let u0 be
a function from I × (Zm−1+ ×R+) to R such that for any given i ∈ I, u0(i, x) is the
utility of agent i at consumption bundle x ∈ Zm−1+ × R+. Let e be a λ-integrable
function from I to Zm−1+ × R+, where e(i), (also denoted by ei) is the initial en-
dowment of agent i. We can represent E0 by {(I, I, λ), u0, e}. Let ∆m be the unit
simplex in Rm.
1See condition (iii) on page 1277 in [10], condition (c) on page 2434 in [19].
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We shall use some results in Mas-Colell in [17], so our economy E0 need satisfy
some corresponding conditions (A1)-(A4).2
(A1) The expected mean endowment
∫
I
e(i)dλ is strictly positive.
(A2) u0(i, x) is I-measurable in i ∈ I, continuous and monotonic3 in x ∈
Zm−1+ × R+.
(A3) Let b equal (0, 0, · · · , 1). For any i ∈ I and x ∈ Zm−1+ ×R+, there exists a
positive real number β such that u0(i, βb) > u0(i, x).
(A4) Let em(i) represent the m−th component of e(i). The integrable function
em(·) induces a continuous distribution from I to R+.
It is noted in [32] that it is sufficient to use the condition in (A4) instead of the
stronger atomless assumption in Mas-Collel [17]. Therefore, we shall introduce our
Theorem 3.2.1, which is similar to the one in Mas-Collel [17].
Theorem 3.2.1. Let E0 be a large deterministic economy. Assume that (A1)-(A4)
are satisfied, then there is a competitive equilibrium for E0.4
We now provide several standard concepts in the following definition for easy
reading.
Definition 3.2.2. 1. An allocation for the economy E0 is simply an integrable
function x from (I, I, λ) to Zm−1+ × R+.
2. An allocation x is said to be individually rational if for λ-almost i ∈ I,
u0(i, x(i)) ≥ u0(i, e(i)).






2Note that preferences are used in [32] while we use utility functions here. It is easy to
show that when we work with the preferences induced by the utility functions u(i, ·, s, t), we can
still obtain measurability and essential independence for the relevant mappings into the space of
preferences so that Theorem 4 in [32] is applicable in our context.
3This means that if x, y ∈ Zm−1+ × R+, x ≥ y with x 6= y, then u0(i, x) > u0(i, y).
4For the details we can see [17].
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4. A feasible allocation x is efficient in E0 if there does not exist any other
feasible allocation y such that u0(i, y(i)) > u0(i, x(i)) for λ-almost all i ∈ I.5
5. A feasible allocation x is a Walrasian allocation (competitive equilibrium
allocation) in E0 if there is a price system p ∈ ∆m such that for λ-almost all i ∈ I,
x(i) is a maximal element in the budget set {z ∈ Zm−1+ ×R+ : p · z ≤ p · e(i)} under
the utility function u0(i, ·).
3.2.2 The Economic Model
We now turn to consider an atomless economy with asymmetric information, which
is similar to the one in [33] and corresponds to the asymptotic replica economies in
[19]. However, now our common consumption set is no longer the positive orthant
Rm+ , but Zm−1+ ×R+ instead. Let u represent a function from I×(Zm−1+ ×R+)×S to
R+ such that for any given i ∈ I, u(i, x, s) is the utility of agent i at consumption
bundle x ∈ Zm−1+ ×R+ and true state s ∈ S. We assume that the utility functions
take non-negative values to avoid stating various integrability conditions explicitly.
In fact, one can impose the condition of linear growth on the utilities to guarantee
that the relevant expected utilities as used in this paper are finite. A real-valued
function v on Zm−1+ ×R+ is said to satisfy the condition of linear growth if there exist
positive numbers α and β such that v(x) ≤ α‖x‖+β for all x ∈ Zm−1+ ×R+. When
a continuous function v satisfies that condition, v(y(·)) is integrable on (T, T , P T )
whenever y(·) is so. For any given s ∈ S, assume that u(i, x, s), (also denoted by
us(i, x)),
6 is I-measurable in i ∈ I. Let e be a λ-integrable function from I to
Zm−1+ × R+, e(i) (also denoted by ei) is the initial endowment of agent i.
5The monotonicity assumption implies that the efficiency of x is equivalent to the nonexistence
of a feasible allocation y such that u0(i, y(i)) ≥ u0(i, x(i)) for λ-almost all i ∈ I with a strict
inequality for a set of agents i with λ-positive measure.
6In the sequel, we shall often use subscripts to denote some variable of a function that is
viewed as a parameter in a particular context.
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For any given s ∈ S, Ecs = {(I, I, λ), us, e} is a large deterministic economy.
We call the collection Ec = {Ecs : s ∈ S} a Complete Information Economy (CIE).
The following definition is an analog of Definition 3.2.1 in the setting of CIE.
Definition 3.2.3. 1. An allocation for the CIE is a function xc from I × S to
Zm−1+ × R+ such that for each s ∈ S, xcs is λ-integrable. Let Ac be the collection
of all the allocations for the CIE.
2. A CIE allocation xc is said to be individually rational if for each s ∈ S, xcs
is individually rational in Ecs .
3. A CIE allocation xc is feasible if for each s ∈ S, xcs is feasible in Ecs .
4. A feasible CIE allocation xc is said to be efficient if for each s ∈ S, xcs is
efficient in Ecs .
5. A feasible CIE allocation xc is said to be aWalrasian allocation (competitive
equilibrium allocation) if for each s ∈ S, there is a price system ps ∈ ∆m such that
(xcs, ps) is a competitive equilibrium in Ecs .
The agents are informed with the true state when they are in the complete
information economy. However, if the agents are only informed with their own
signals but not the true state, then they are in the private information economy.
We shall consider this corresponding economy.
In the private information economy, the agents will use the conditional prob-
ability measure P S(·|t) on S to compute their expected utilities. For t ∈ T , the
ex post utility Ui(x|t) of agent i (also denoted by U(i, x, t)) for her consumption




It is obvious that for any fixed x ∈ Zm−1+ × R+, U(i, x, t) is I ⊗ T -measurable
in (i, t) ∈ I × T and continuous in x ∈ Zm−1+ × R+. The collection Ep =
{(I ×Ω, I £F , λ£ P ), u, e, (t˜i, i ∈ I), s˜} is called a Private Information Economy
(PIE). For each fixed t ∈ T , Ept = {(I, I, λ), U(·, ·, t), e} is a large deterministic
economy. The following definition adapts Definition 3.2.3 to the setting of a PIE.
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Definition 3.2.4. 1. An allocation for the PIE is an integrable function xp from
(I×T, I£T , λ£P T ) to Zm−1+ ×R+. Let Ap be the collection of all the allocations
for the PIE.
2. A PIE allocation xp is said to be ex post individually rational if for P T -almost
all t ∈ T , xpt is individually rational in Ept .
3. A PIE allocation xp is ex post feasible if for P T -almost all t ∈ T , xpt is feasible
in Ept .
4. A feasible PIE allocation xp is said to be ex post efficient if for P T -almost
all t ∈ T , xpt is efficient in Ept .
5. A feasible PIE allocation xp is said to be an ex post Walrasian allocation
(ex post competitive equilibrium allocation) if there is a measurable price function
p from (T, T ) to ∆m such that for P T -almost all t ∈ T , (xpt , pt) is a competitive
equilibrium in Ept .
Each agent i is privately informed with her signal ti in the Private Information
Economy. It is of interest to know whether the agent will have any incentive to
mis-report that signal. We try to find the balance between the incentive compati-
bility and optimal efficiency. The following definition of incentive compatibility is
standard.
Definition 3.2.5. For a PIE allocation xp, an agent i ∈ I, a signal profile t ∈ T ,














which is the expected utility of agent i when she receives private signal ti but mis-
reports as t′i. The PIE allocation x
p is said to be incentive compatible if λ-almost
all i ∈ I,
Ui(x
p
i , ti|ti) ≥ Ui(xpi , t′i|ti)
holds for τi-almost all ti, t
′
i ∈ T 0.
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3.2.3 Incentive Compatibility and Ex Post Efficient, Wal-
rasian Allocations
Define a mapping Φ from the set Ac of CIE allocations to the set Ap of PIE
allocations as follows. For any CIE allocation xc ∈ Ac, let
Φ(xc)(i, t) =
 e(i) if t ∈ L0,xc(i, s) if t ∈ Ls, s ∈ S (3.2.1)
for (i, t) ∈ I × T . It is obvious that Φ(xc) is integrable on (I × T, I ⊗ T , λ⊗ P T ),
(and thus integrable on the extension (I × T, I £ T , λ£P T )), and consequently is
a PIE allocation. This means that Φ is indeed a mapping from Ac to Ap.
We shall state some property about the conditional probability P S(·|t), t ∈ T ,
which will be used in our following theorem.
Let δs be the Dirac measure on S that gives probability one to the point s
and zero to other points. Define a function H from T to the space of probability
measures on S by letting
H(t) =
 δs for t ∈ Ls, s ∈ S,δs1 for t ∈ L0.
Theorem 3.2.7 below shows that the conditional independence of the signal
process F together with the associated exact law of large numbers as shown in [31]
and [34] implies that P T (∪s′∈SLs′) = 1, and H(t), t ∈ T is a version of the condi-
tional probability P S(·|t), t ∈ T . Note that using H as the conditional probability
P S(·|t), t ∈ T means the following. When all the signals are reported by the agents
to form a signal profile t, the agents will be able to determine the true state to be
s if the cross-sectional signal distribution λF−1t is observed to be µs.
Theorem 3.2.6. If F is essentially pairwise independent conditioned on s˜, then
P T (∪s′∈SLs′) = 1, and H(t), t ∈ T is a version of P S(·|t), t ∈ T .
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Proof : The exact law of large numbers as stated in Corollary 2.2.2 above says that
the set Ls = {t ∈ T : λF−1t = µs} has P Ts -probability one. Thus, P Ts (Ls′) = 0





1. Hence, P T is a convex combination of mutually singular probability measures
P Ts , s ∈ S.
Fix any s′ ∈ S, B ∈ T . Since B \ Ls′ is a subset of T \ Ls′ , which is a P Ts′ -null
set, we have P Ts′ (B \Ls′) = 0. Thus, P Ts′ (B∩Ls′) = P Ts′ (B)−P Ts′ (B \Ls′) = P Ts′ (B).
Hence, for any s ∈ S, we have the following identities∫
B



















δs′({s})dP Ts′ (t) = pisP Ts (B ∩ Ls) = pisP Ts (B)
= P ({s} ×B) =
∫
B
P S({s}|t)dP Ts (t) (3.2.2)
which implies that H(t), t ∈ T is indeed a version of P S(·|t), t ∈ T , by the arbitrary
choices of s ∈ S and B ∈ T . 2
We will show that Φ plays a central role between the two economies Ec and Ep.
In particular, under assumption that F is an idiosyncratic signal process, any CIE
allocation xc can be transformed to an incentive compatible PIE allocation Φ(xc),
and the ex post efficiency of Φ(xc) is equivalent to the efficiency of xc. The same
type of equivalence also holds for Walrasian allocation.
The following conditions are an analog of (A1)-(A4), the only difference is that




e(i)dλ is in the strictly positive cone Rm++.
(B2) For any given s ∈ S, u(i, x, s) is continuous and monotonic in x ∈ Zm−1+ ×
R+.
(B3) Let b be (0, 0, · · · , 1). For any given s ∈ S, i ∈ I and x ∈ Zm−1+ × R+,
there exists a positive real number β such that u(i, βb, s) > u(i, x, s).
3.2 Economies with Common Values 25
(B4) Let em(i) represent the m−th component of e(i). The integral function
em(·) induces a continuous distribution from I to R+.
Theorem 3.2.7. (1) If F is a signal process with negligible influence from private
signals, then the PIE allocation Φ(xc) is always incentive compatible for any CIE
allocation xc.
(2) Assume that the process F is essentially pairwise independent conditioned
on s˜. Let xc be any CIE allocation. Then xc is individually rational, or feasible,
or efficient, or a Walrasian allocation in the CIE if and only if Φ(xc) has the
corresponding ex post version of the property in the PIE. In addition, we have∫
T
ui(Φ(x
c)(i, t), s)dP Ts (t) = ui(x
c(i, s), s), (3.2.3)
which means that the expected utility of Φ(xc)(i, ·) conditioned on the true state s
is always the utility of xc(i, s).
Proof :(1): By Definition 3.1.1 (1), we know that there is a set A∗ ∈ I with
λ(A∗) = 1 such that for any i ∈ A∗, there is a set Ai ∈ I with λ(Ai) = 1 such that
for any t ∈ T and t′i ∈ T 0, the sample functions F(t−i,ti)(·) and F(t−i,t′i)(·) agree on
Ai. Since the society’s signal distribution cannot be influenced by a negligible set





. This means that for any
i ∈ A∗, t ∈ T , t′i ∈ T 0, and s ∈ S,
t ∈ Ls ⇔ λF−1t = µs ⇔ λF−1(t−i,t′i) = µs ⇔ (t−i, t
′
i) ∈ Ls. (3.2.4)
Since L0 is T \ ∪s∈SLs, we also know that t ∈ L0 ⇔ (t−i, t′i) ∈ L0.
Denote Φ(xc) by xp. We have for any i ∈ A∗, xp(i, t) = xp(i, (t−i, t′i)) for any
t ∈ T and t′i ∈ T 0. Therefore, the condition of incentive compatibility in Definition
3.2.4 is satisfied by xp. Thus, part (1) is shown.
(2): Assume that F is essentially pairwise independent conditioned on s˜. The
exact law of large numbers as stated in Corollary 2.2.2 says that the set Ls = {t ∈
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T : λF−1t = µs} has P Ts -probability one. Since, for any s ∈ S, i ∈ I, one always








c)(i, t), s)dP Ts (t) = ui(x
c(i, s), s),
which is equation (3.2.3).
We know that H is a version of the conditional probability P S(·|t) by Theorem
3.2.6. Thus, for any version of the conditional probability P S(·|t), we always have
P S(·|t) = δs for P T -almost all t ∈ Ls. Hence, for P T -almost all t ∈ Ls,
U(i, ·, t) =
∑
s′∈S
u(i, ·, s′)P S({s′}|t) =
∑
s′∈S
u(i, ·, s′)δs({s′}) = u(i, ·, s)
for all i ∈ I,7 and Ept = Ecs . Let Bs = {t ∈ Ls : Ept = Ecs}; then P T (Ls \ Bs) = 0.
Hence, for any t ∈ Bs, the ex post economy-allocation pair (Ept , xp(·, t)) is exactly
the same as the complete information economy-allocation pair (Ecs , xc(·, s)), which
means that they must have the same properties.
Thus, if xc is efficient, then for each fixed s ∈ S, xc(·, s) is efficient for Ecs . This
means that xp(·, t) is efficient for Ept for any t ∈ Bs. Since P T (Ls \ Bs) = 0 for
each s ∈ S, P T (∪s∈SBs) = P T (∪s∈SLs) = 1. Hence xp(·, t) is efficient for Ept for
P T -almost all t ∈ T . Hence xp is ex post efficient.
For the other direction, fix any s ∈ S. If xp is ex post efficient, then xp(·, t)
is efficient for Ept for P T -almost all t ∈ T , and in particular for P T -almost all




s′ (Ls) = pisP
T
s (Ls) = pis > 0, we can
certainly find a t ∈ Bs such that xp(·, t) is efficient for Ept . For such a t ∈ Bs, since
the economy-allocation pairs (Ept , xp(·, t)) and (Ecs , xc(·, s)) are the same, we obtain
that xc(·, s) is efficient for Ecs . Since s is arbitrarily chosen in S, we know that xc
is efficient.
7Here we note that the Dirac measure δs has probability one at the point s and zero at those
points s′ ∈ S with s′ 6= s.
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The rest of the proof for part (2) follows clearly from the definition of each of
the properties in Definition 3.2.3 and their ex post versions in Definition 3.2.4 by
using the argument adopted for the proof of efficiency. 2
Thus, the existence of incentive compatible, ex post Walrasian, (and thus ex post
individually rational and ex post efficient) allocations, follows from the usual exis-
tence result on our Theorem 3.2.1.
Theorem 3.2.8. Assumed that (B1)-(B4) are satisfied. If F is an idiosyncratic
signal process, then there exists an incentive compatible PIE allocation xp that is
an ex post Walrasian allocation (and thus ex post individually rational and ex post
efficient).
Proof : By Theorem 3.2.1, there exists an allocation xc that is a Walrasian al-
location for the CIE. By parts (1) and (2) of Theorem 3.2.7, the PIE allocation
xp = Φ(xc) is an incentive compatible, ex post Walrasian allocation, which is ob-
viously also individually rational and ex post efficient. Hence part our theorem
follows. 2
3.3 Economies with Type Dependent Utility Func-
tions
3.3.1 The Economic Model
In the above section, we focus on an atomless economy with asymmetric infor-
mation, where no agents’ types appear in utility functions. In this section, we
shall consider the more general case that allows agents’ types to enter the utility
functions.
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We shall follow the definitions and notations above. The common consumption
set now is Zm−1+ ×R+. Let v be a function from I × (Zm−1+ ×R+)× S ×G0 to R+
such that for any given i ∈ I, v(i, x, s, g) is the utility of agent i at consumption
bundle x, true state s, and the agent’s signal g. For any given s ∈ S, and g ∈ G0,
assume that v(i, x, s, g), (also denoted by vs,gi (x)) is I-measurable in i ∈ I. For
given (s, t), let u(i, x, s, t) = v(i, x, s, F (i, t)). It can be easily checked that for
any fixed x ∈ Zm−1+ × R+, s ∈ S, u(i, x, s, t) is I £ T -measurable. For any fixed
x ∈ Zm−1+ × R+, s ∈ S, and r ∈ R, one can simply observe that {(i, t) ∈ I × T :
u(i, x, s, t) < r} = ∪g∈G0 [F−1({g}) ∩ {(i, t) ∈ I × T : v(i, x, s, g) < r}] . Let e be
an integrable function from I to Zm−1+ × R+ and e(i), (also denoted by ei) is the
initial endowment of agent i.
As in [10] and Section 3.2 here, we can define a Private Information Economy,
where the agents are informed with their signals but not the true state. The ex post
utility Ui(x|t) of agent i, (also denoted by U(i, t, x)), for the agent’s consumption
x ∈ Zm−1+ × R+ with the given signal profile t is
∑
s∈S u(i, x, s, t)P
S({s}|t). It is
obvious that for any fixed x ∈ Zm−1+ × R+, U(i, t, x) is I £ T -measurable. For
each fixed t ∈ T , Ept = {(I, I, λ), U(·, ·, t), e} is a large deterministic economy. The
collection Ep = {(I × Ω, I £ F , λ £ P ), u, e, F, (t˜i, i ∈ I), s˜} is called a Private
Information Economy (PIE). Definition 3.2.4 is still applicable for the PIE in this
section.
The following definition of incentive compatibility is the same as Definition
3.2.5 except that the utility functions ui are now signal dependent.
Definition 3.3.1. For a PIE allocation xp, an agent i ∈ I, a signal profile t ∈ T ,












i), s, (t−i, ti))dP
S×T−i(·|ti),
which is the expected utility of agent i when she receives private signal ti but mis-
reports as t′i. The PIE allocation x
p is said to be incentive compatible if λ-almost




i , ti|ti) ≥ Ui(xpi , t′i|ti)
holds for τi-almost all ti, t
′
i ∈ T 0.
3.3.2 Consistency of Incentive Compatibility and Efficiency
For each s ∈ S, consider the large deterministic economy Es = {(I × T, I £ T , λ£
P T ), us, e}, where the utility function for agent (i, t) ∈ I×T is us(i, t, ·) = u(i, ·, s, t)
and the initial endowment for agent (i, t) is e(i). When the signal process F is
essentially pairwise independent conditioned on s˜, we can restate part of Theorem
4 in [32] as our Lemma 3.3.2 for the convenience of the reader. For this purpose,
we assume that the underlying measure space (I × T, I £ T , λ £ P Ts ) is a Loeb
product space for each s ∈ S. Notice that Loeb product spaces provide a big class
of measure spaces that extend the usual measure-theoretic products and retain the
Fubini property. For the purposes of modeling limits of large, but finite phenomena,
there is no loss of generality to work with Loeb product spaces since they themselves
can be viewed as the limiting objects for sequences of product measure spaces see
[15] and [31] for more details.




e(i)dλ is in the strictly positive cone Rm++.
(C2) For any given s ∈ S, i ∈ I, and g ∈ G0, v(i, x, s, g) is continuous and
monotonic in x ∈ Zm−1+ × R+.
(C3) Let b be (0, 0, · · · , 1). For any given s ∈ S, i ∈ I, g ∈ G0 and x ∈ Zm−1+ ×
R+, there exists a positive real number β such that v(i, βb, s, g) > v(i, x, s, g).
(C4) Let em(i) represent the m−th component of e(i). The integral function
em(·) induces a continuous distribution from I to R+.
Assume that the underlying measure space (I×T, I£T , λ£P Ts ) is a Loeb product
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space for each s ∈ S. To make those variables that are given parameters in the
particular context clear, we use subscripts extensively in this section. When our
economy satisfy conditions (C1)-(C4), we have the following lemma which is part
of Theorem 4 in [32].
Lemma 3.3.2. We assume that the conditions (C1)-(C4) are satisfied, and the
signal process F is essentially pairwise independent conditioned on s˜. Then, for
each fixed s ∈ S, there is a Walrasian allocation xs with a strictly positive price
system ps for the economy Es such that for P Ts -almost all t ∈ T , x(s,t) is a Wal-
rasian allocation with a price system ps for the large deterministic economy E(s,t) =
{(I, I, λ), u(s,t), e}.8
Based on Lemma 3.3.2, we can prove the following theorem that corresponds
to the result of Theorem 3.2.8.
Theorem 3.3.3. Assume that the conditions (C1)-(C4) are satisfied. If F is an
idiosyncratic signal process, then there exists an incentive compatible allocation xp
in the Private Information Economy such that xp is an ex post Walrasian allocation
(and thus ex post individually rational, and ex post efficient).
Proof : By Lemma 3.3.2, there is a Walrasian allocation xs with a strictly pos-
itive price system ps for the economy Es such that for P Ts -almost all t ∈ T ,
(ps, x(s,t)) is a Walrasian equilibrium for the the large deterministic economy E(s,t) =
{(I, I, λ), u(s,t), e}. Without loss of generality, assume that for every agent (i, t) ∈
I × T , xs(i, t) is the maximal element within her budget set. Thus, for each i ∈ I,
t, t′ ∈ T , agents (i, t) and (i, t′) have the same endowment, and consequently the
same budget set. Hence the utility of agent (i, t) at xs(i, t) is greater than or equal
to her utility at xs(i, t
′) since xs(i, t′) belongs to the budget set of agent (i, t). This
8When S is the trivial singleton set, Lemma 3.3.2 is actually a statement on the existence of
an ex post Walrasian equilibrium with a common price system.
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means that
∀i ∈ I, s ∈ S, t, t′ ∈ T, u(i, xs(i, t), s, t) ≥ u(i, xs(i, t′), s, t). (3.3.1)
As in equation (3.2.1), define a mapping xp from I×T to Zm−1+ ×R+ by letting
xp(i, t) =
 e(i) if t ∈ L0,xs(i, t) if t ∈ Ls, s ∈ S
for (i, t) ∈ I × T . It is obvious that xp is integrable on (I × T, I £ T , λ£P T ), and
hence a PIE allocation.
By the same argument in the first paragraph of the proof of Theorem 3.2.7, we
obtain that for λ-almost all i ∈ I, for any t ∈ T , t′i ∈ T 0 and s ∈ S, t ∈ Ls if and




i (t−i, ti), s, (t−i, ti)) = ui(xs(i, t), s, t) ≥ ui(xs(i, (t−i, t′i)), s, t) = ui(xpi (t−i, t′i), s, (t−i, ti));
when t ∈ L0, we also have (t−i, t′i) ∈ L0; hence
ui(x
p




i), s, (t−i, ti)).
Thus, for λ-almost all i ∈ I, we have Ui(xpi , ti|ti) ≥ Ui(xpi , t′i|ti) for τi-almost all
ti, t
′
i ∈ T 0. Therefore, xp is an incentive compatible PIE allocation.
Fix any s ∈ S. Theorem 3.2.6 says that P S(·|t) = δs for P T -almost all t ∈ Ls.




s′ with pis′ > 0, a P
T -null set is a P Ts -null set; hence
P S(·|t) = δs for P Ts -almost all t ∈ Ls. Let Es be the set of all t ∈ Ls such that
P S(·|t) = δs, and (ps, x(s,t)) is a Walrasian equilibrium for E(s,t). Then, the above






Let E = ∪s∈SEs. Then















Since the sets Ls, s ∈ S are disjoint, so are Es, s ∈ S. For any t ∈ E, there is a









which implies that xp is feasible for the PIE.
Define a measurable function p∗ from (T, T ) to Rm++ by letting
p∗(t) =
 e∗ if t ∈ L0,ps if t ∈ Ls, s ∈ S
where e∗ is the vector whose components are 1/m.
Fix any s ∈ S and t ∈ Es. Then, Ut = u(s,t), p∗(t) = ps, Ept = E(s,t) and
xpt = x(s,t). Since (ps, x(s,t)) is a Walrasian equilibrium for E(s,t), (p∗(t), xpt ) is a
Walrasian equilibrium for Ept .
Hence, for any t ∈ E, (p∗(t), xpt ) is a Walrasian equilibrium for Ept . Since
P T (E) = 1, xp is thus an incentive compatible and ex post Walrasian allocation in
the PIE, and therefore ex post individually rational, and ex post efficient. 2
3.4 Remarks
So far, we have showed our main results. We capture the meaning of perfect com-
petition in a differential information economy, whose consumption bundle consists
of m− 1 indivisible and 1 divisible goods.
(1) The method of the proof in our main theorem, Theorem 3.2.7 and Theorem
3.2.8 mainly follow the one of Theorem 1 in [33], but the usual existence result on
Walrasian allocation is different from divisible and indivisible conditions. When
the consumption goods is divisible, Aumann [5] and Hildenbrand [11] have pro-
vided us the existence on Walrasian allocation already. For the case of indivisible
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goods, we prove our own Theorem 3.2.1 based on the result in Mas-Colell [17].
(2) Our another main theorem, Theorem 3.3.3, whose proof is similar to that
of Theorem 2 in [33]. For the random economy with indivisible goods, the proof
of our Theorem 3.3.3 is based on Lemma 3.3.2, which is part of Theorem 4 in [32],
while Theorem 2 in [33] is proved directly.
Chapter 4
Large Games with Transformed
Summary Statistics
In this chapter, we show the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium for a non-
cooperative game with a continuum of small players and a compact action space
with more details. The players’ payoffs depend on their own actions and the mean
of the transformed strategy profiles. This covers the case when the payoffs depend
on players’ own actions and finitely many summary statistics.
This chapter include three parts. In section 4.1, we provide the introduction to
games. Main theorem by two kinds of proofs is shown in our section 4.2. Section
4.3 gives some specific examples and remarks.
4.1 Introduction to Games
A game can be expressed into two different ways: normal (or strategic) form rep-
resentation and extensive form representation. Although theoretically, these two
representations are almost equivalent, the normal one is more convenient for us to
discuss static games, and another one is more useful in dynamic games. We only
34
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present the game in normal form and discuss the properties of such expression in
this thesis since we restrict our discussion to static games.
4.1.1 Describing a Game
The essential elements of a game are players, actions, information, strategies, pay-
offs, outcomes, and equilibria. At a minimum, the games’s description must include
the players, strategies, and payoffs, for which the actions and information are build-
ing blocks. The players, actions, and outcomes are collectively referred to as the
rules of the game, and the modeler’s objective is to use the rules of the game to
determine the equilibrium.
In order to understand well, we now consider a classic example - The Prisoners
Dilemma. Two suspects are arrested and charged with a crime. The police lack
sufficient evidence to convict the suspects, unless at least one confesses. The police
hold the suspects in separate cells and explain the consequences that will follow
from the actions they could take. If neither confesses then both will be convicted of
a minor offense and sentenced to one month in jail. If both confess then both will
be sentenced to jail for six months. Finally, if one confesses but the other does not,
then the confessor will be released immediately but the other will be sentenced to
nice months in jail - six for the crime and a further three for obstructing justice.
(1) Players are the individuals who make decisions. Each player’s goal is to maxi-
mize his utility by choice of actions.
In our classic example, those two suspects are players.
(2) An action or move by player i, denoted ai, is a choice he can make.
Player i’s action set Ai is the entire set of actions available to him.
An action combination is an ordered set a = (a1, · · · , an), of one action for each
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of the n players in the game.
Our example specifies the same action sets for both suspects: confess and not
confess.
(3) Information is the players’ knowledge of the game. Here, we use Ti to de-
note the information set of player i.
(4) Player’s i’s strategy si, is a rule that tells him which action to choose at each
instant of the game, given his information set.
Player’s i’s strategy set or strategy space Si is the set of strategies available to
him.
A strategy combination S = (s1, · · · , sn) is an ordered set consisting of one
strategy for each of the n players in the game.
In our example, each player has two strategies available: confess (or fink) and
not confess (or be mum).
(5) By player i’s Payoff pii(s1, · · · , sn), we mean either:
(i) The utility he receives after all players and Nature have picked their strategies
and the game has been played out; or
(ii) The expected utility he receives as a function of the strategies chosen by
himself and the other players.1
Definitions (i) and (ii) are distinct and different, but in the literature the term
Payoff is used for both the actual payoff and the expected payoff.
(6) The outcome of the game is a set of interesting elements that the modeler picks
from the values of actions, payoffs, and other variables after the game is played out.
1In economics, the payoffs are usually firms’ profits or consumer’s utility.
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(7) An equilibrium s∗ = (s∗1, · · · , s∗n) is a strategy combination consisting of a
best strategy for each player in the game.
(8) The best response of player i to strategies s−i2 chosen by the other players
is the strategy s∗i the maximize his payoff; that is,
Ui(s
∗
i , s−i) ≥ Ui(s′i, s−i),∀s′i 6= s∗i .
In general, we have two types of strategies: pure strategy, and mixed strategy.
We present the standard concepts below.
(1) A pure strategy is for each player i, to choose his action si ∈ Si for sure given
the information he learns. More specifically, a pure strategy can be expressed as a
measurable function pi : Ti → Ai. Note that strategy and action are two different
concepts: strategy is the rule of action but not action itself. But, in static games,
strategy is just the same as action. Thus, the pure strategy space is just A in our
discussion. So, in the following discussions in this chapter, we do not distinguish si
with ai or Si with Ai. In this case, the payoff function Ui of player i is a function
of s(a); and for any given s, the value of Ui is fixed.
(2) A mixed strategy3for player i is a probability distribution over his pure strategy
set Si of pure strategies given certain information. To differ from pure strategies,
2Here, it means “all the other players’ strategies”, which follows usual shorthand notation in
game theory. For any vector x = (x1, · · · , xn), we denote the vector (x1, · · · , xi−1, xi+1, · · · , xn)
by x−i.
3From these definitions, we can see that pure strategy can be understood as the special case of
mixed strategy. For instant, pure strategy s′i is equivalent to the mixed strategy σi(1, 0, · · · , 0),
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we now denote mixed strategies for player i as σi rather than si. Thus, the mixed
strategy of player i can be expressed as σi = (σi1, · · · , σiK), where σik = σ(sik)
is the probability for player i to choose strategy sik, ∀k = 1, · · · , K, 0 ≤ σik ≤
1,
∑K
1 σik = 1. We use Σi to denote the mixed strategy space for player i(that
is, σi ∈ Σi, where σi is one of the mixed strategies of player i). The vector
σ = (σ1, · · · , σn) is called a mixed strategy profile and cartesian product Σ = ×iΣi
represents mixed strategy space (σ ∈ Σ). The support of a mixed strategy σi is the
set of pure strategies to which σi assigns positive probability. In finite case, for a




j=1 σj(sj))Ui(s), which is still
denoted as Ui(σ) in a slight abuse of notation.
4
4.1.2 Nash Equilibrium
A Nash equilibrium is a profile of strategies such that each player’s strategy is an
optimal response to the other players’ strategies.
A (mixed) strategy profile σ∗ = (σ∗1, · · · , σ∗n) is a Nash equilibrium if for any





−i) ≥ Ui(σi, σ∗−i),∀σi ∈ Σi.
The existence of Nash equilibrium was first established by Nash [21]. The
voluminous research about the existence of equilibrium in different games is often
based on the techniques that Nash attempted. So we provide both the theorem and
the proof of the existence of Nash equilibrium below, which are stated in Nash [21].
The idea of the proof is to apply Kakutani’s fixed-point theorem to the players’
“reaction correspondences”.
which means, for player i, the probability of choosing s′i is 1, probabilities of choosing any other
pure strategies is 0.
4Note that the payoff Ui(σ) of player i is linear function of player i’s mixing probability σi.
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Theorem 4.1.1. (Nash, 1950) There exists at least one Nash equilibrium (pure or
mixed) for any finite game.
Proof: We use ri(σ) to represent the “reaction correspondences” of i, which maps
each strategy profile σ to the set of mixed strategies that maximize player i’s payoff
when others play σ−i. Define the correspondence r : Σ ³ Σ to be the Cartesian
product of the ri. If there exists a fixed point σ
∗ ∈ Σ such that σ∗ ∈ r(σ∗) and for
each i, σ∗i ∈ ri(σ∗), then this fixed point is a Nash equilibrium by the construction.
So, our task now is to show all the conditions of Kakutani fixed-point are satisfied.
First note that each Σi is a probability space, so it is a simplex of dimension
(J − 1), where J is the number of pure strategies of player i. This means, Σi (so
is Σ) is compact, convex and nonempty.
Second, as we noted before, each player’s payoff is linear, and therefore contin-
uous in his own mixed strategy. So ri(σ) is non-empty since continuous functions
on compacts always can attain maxima.
Moreover the linearity of payoff function means: if σ′ ∈ r(σ) and σ′′ ∈ r(σ),
then λσ′ + (1− λ)σ′′ ∈ r(σ), where λ ∈ (0, 1) (that just means, if both σ′i and σ′′i
are best responses to σ−i, then so is their weighted average). So, r(σ) is convex.
Finally, to show r(σ) is upper hemi-continuous we need to show that r(σ) has
closed graph, i.e., if (σm, σ˜m) → (σ, σ˜), σ˜m ∈ r(σm), then σ˜ ∈ r(σ). Assume there
is a sequence (σm, σ˜m) → (σ, σ˜), σ˜m ∈ r(σm), but σ˜ /∈ r(σ). Then, σ˜i /∈ ri(σ) for
some i. Thus, there is a ε > 0 and a σ′i such that Ui(σ
′
i, σ−i) > Ui(σ˜i, σ−i) + 3ε.
And since Ui is continuous, and (σ








i, σ−i)− ε > Ui(σ˜i, σ−i) + 2ε > Ui(σ˜mi , σm−i) + ε.
Hence, σ˜mi /∈ ri(σm), which contradicts the assumption we made. So, r(σ) is upper
hemi-continuous.
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Since all the conditions of Kakutani fixed-point theorem are satisfied, the result
follows. 2
4.1.3 Large Games
The games with a small number of players are called small games, which is hardly
adequate to represent free-market situations. In this attempt, games with such a
large number of players that any single player has a negligible effect on the payoffs
to the other players. Thus, we can use the number of points on a line (for example,
the unit interval, [0, 1].) As we deal with such games, we often restrict them as
atomless games.
We now restate the settings and the results in Rath [24].
Let I = [0, 1] endowed with Lebesgue measure λ be the set of players, P
the space of actions where P is a compact subset of Rn. A strategy profile is a
measurable function from I to P . Let FP denote the space of all strategy profiles
and for any f ∈ FP let s(f) =
∫
I
fdλ, and SP = {s(f)|f ∈ FP}.
Now, let UP denote the set of real-valued continuous functions defined on P×SP
endowed with sup norm topology.
Then, we say, a game is a measurable function g : I → UP . And a Nash
equilibrium of a game g is a f ∈ FP such that for almost all t, g(t)(f(t), s(f)) ≥
g(t)(x, s(f)), ∀x ∈ P .
Theorem 4.1.2. Every game described above has a Nash equilibrium.
The argument of the proof also makes use of Kakutani’s fixed point theorem as
what is did in classical proof in Nash [22]. For details, one can refer to Rath [24].
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4.2 The Model and Result
Let I be the set of players, I be a σ−algebra of subsets of I, and λ be an atomless
probability measure on I. We use (I, I, λ) to represent the space of player names.
For example, one can take (I, I, λ) as the unit interval [0, 1] with Lebesgue measure.
Let P denote a nonempty, compact and metric space such that each player
i ∈ I chooses a pure strategy from P . For instance, P might be the set of possible
prices an individual firm can set for its product. A strategy profile is a measurable
function f : I → P , which specifies a strategy for each player.
Let s be a continuous function from P to the n-dimensional Euclidean space
Rn, and C the range of s. The continuity of s and compactness of P imply that
C is also compact. Let Σ (for example, we can set Σ = convC, the convex hull of
C) be a convex and compact subset of Rn, which contains C. It is clear that for
any strategy profile f , σf =
∫
I
(s ◦ f)dλ ∈ Σ. The mean σf of s ◦ f is a summary
statistics of the society which the players can observe. A payoff function for a
player is a real-valued continuous function defined on P × Σ, which means that it
depends on her own action p ∈ P and the vector σ ∈ Σ of summary statistics. Let
P denote the space of all continuous payoff functions with the supremum norm.
Now, we define a game to be a measurable function Γ : I → P , which assigns
each player i ∈ I a continuous payoff function Γ(i)(·, ·). An equilibrium (in pure
strategies) for such a game is a strategy profile f : I → P such that each player
plays a best response against the induced vector of summary statistics; i.e.,
Γ(i)(f(i), σf ) ≥ Γ(i)(p, σf )




In the following theorem, we present a general result on the existence of equi-
librium for the game Γ.
Theorem 4.2.1. Let (I, I, λ) be an atomless probability space, P a nonempty,
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compact metric space, s a continuous function from P onto a compact subset C of
Rn, and Σ a compact, convex subset of Rn containing C. Let P denote the space of
real-valued continuous functions on P × Σ with the supremum norm. Then every
game Γ : I → P has an equilibrium in pure strategies.
Proof: First, define the best-response correspondence B : I × Σ→ P as
B(i, σ) = argmaxp∈PΓ(i)(p, σ),
which is the set of maximum points for the continuous function Γ(i)(·, σ) on P .
By standard arguments (see, for example, Rath [24]), we can obtain that for each
σ ∈ Σ, B(·, σ) is a closed-valued, measurable correspondence from I to P ; and for
each i ∈ I, B(i, ·) is an upper semicontinuous correspondence from Σ to P .
Let F : I × Σ→ Σ be the correspondence defined by F (i, σ) = s(B(i, σ)), and
Φ : Σ→ Σ, a correspondence defined by Φ(σ) = ∫
I
F (i, σ)dλ. We shall show that
Φ is (a) nonempty-valued, (b) convex-valued, (c) upper semicontinuous.
(a) Let σ ∈ Σ. By the standard measurable selection theorem (see, for example,
Theorem 8.1.3 in Aubin and Frankowska [2], there exists a measurable function
f : I → P such that f(i) ∈ B(i, σ) for all i ∈ T . Then the measurable function
g : I → Σ defined by g = s ◦ f satisfies g(i) ∈ F (i, σ) for all i ∈ I. Thus, (a) is
proved.
(b) Since λ is atomless, Φ is convex-valued by Theorem 8.6.3 in Aubin and
Frankowska [2], which is a simple consequence of the classical Lyapunov theorem.
(c) Since B is upper semicontinuous and s is continuous, Theorem 14.22 in
Aliprantis and Border [1] implies that F is upper semicontinuous on Σ for each
i ∈ I. A classical result of Aumann on the preservation of upper semicontinuity
via integration (see, Aumann [6, 4]) says that Φ is also upper semicontinous.
By the Kakutani fixed-point theorem, there exists a σ∗ ∈ Φ(σ∗). That is, there
exists a measurable function g : I → Σ such that σ∗ = ∫
I
gdλ and g(i) ∈ F (i, σ∗).
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Note that F (i, σ∗) = s(B(i, σ∗)), which is a subset of C. Thus, the measurable
function g takes values in C.
Since s is a function from P onto C, we can define a correspondence s−1 from
C to P such that s−1(c) = {p ∈ P : s(p) = c}. Since s is continuous, it is obvi-
ous that s−1 is a weakly measurable correspondence with nonempty closed values
from the measurable space C with Borel σ-algebra to the compact metric space
P . Hence, the Kuratowski-Ryll-Nardzewski Selection Theorem in Aliprantis and
Border [1], implies that we can find a Borel measurable selector h of s−1. Then it
is clear that the strategy profile f : I → P defined by f = h ◦ g is an equilibrium
in pure strategies for the game Γ. 2
Now to illustrate the usage of fixed-point theorems, we present here another proof
of the theorem.
Another proof of Theorem. First define vt(c, σ)=max{Γ(t)(p, σ) : s(p) = c} and de-
fine a correspondence B : T ×Σ→C by B(t, σ) = { a ∈ C | vt(a, σ) ≥ vt(c, σ),∀c ∈
C}. This definition shows that B(t, σ) is the set of the best responses of t given
the σ. And C is nonempty and compact, since P is nonempty and compact. Then
as before, one can get B(t, σ) is nonempty-valued,close-valued, measurable on T
for each σ ∈ Σ, and upper semicontinuous on Σ for each t ∈ T .
Let Φ: Σ→Σ be the correspondence defined by Φ(σ)=∫
T
B(j, σ) dλ. We now
show that Φ is (a)nonempty-valued, (b)convex-valued, and (c)upper semicontinu-
ous.
(a) Let σ ∈ Σ. By the above result of B(t, σ) and the measurable selection
theorem 8.1.3 in Aubin and Frankowska[2], there exists a measurable function g :
T→C such that g(t)∈B(t, σ) for every t ∈ T . So, Φ(σ) is nonempty for every σ.
(b) Since λ is atomless, Φ(σ) is convex by Theorem 8.6.3 in Aubin and Frankowska
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[2].
(c) Since B is upper semicontinuous on Σ for each t ∈ T , Φ is upper semicon-
tinuous by the lemma in Aumann [6].
By the Kakutani fixed-point theorem there exists a σ∗ ∈ Φ(σ∗). In other words,
there exists a measurable function g : T→C such that σ∗=∫
T
g(t) dλ and g(t)∈B(t, σ)
for all t∈T and vt(g(t), σ∗)≥vt(c, σ∗) for every c ∈ C. Similarly to the first proof,
let h be a measurable selector of s−1(the existence of such h can be still illustrated
by Kuratowski-Ryll-Nardzewski Selection in Aliprantis and Border [1], and let the
strategy profile f : T → P defined by f = h ◦ g,which is an equilibrium in pure
strategies, by showing that
vt(g(t), σ
∗)≥vt(c, σ∗) for every c ∈ C.
i.e., vt(s◦f ,σ∗)≥vt(s(p), σ∗) for every p ∈ P .
i.e., max{Γ(t)(f(t), σ∗)}≥ max{Γ(t)(p, σ∗) : s(p) = c} for every p ∈ P .
that is, Γ(t)(f(t), σ∗) ≥ max{Γ(t)(p, σ∗) : s(p) = c} for every p ∈ P . 2
4.3 Remarks and Examples
(1) A continuum of firms, represented by [0, 1], is considered in Vives [36]: the price
pi of firm i’s product is given by pi = Pi(qi, q˜), where qi is firm i’s output, and q˜ is
a vector of summary statistics which characterizes the output distribution of firms
(e.g., q˜ =
∫
s(qi)di, here, when s is the identity function then q˜ is the average
quantity). The profits of firm i, i ∈ [0, 1], is given by pii = (P (qi, q˜) − m)qi − F ,
where F is a fixed cost and m is a constant marginal cost of production. By
taking first-order condition, a Nash equilibrium can be obtained, characterized by
(pi −m)/pi = ²i, where ²i = −(qi/pi)(∂Pi/∂qi) is the quantity elasticity of inverse
demand. The existence of Nash equilibrium can be deduced in Rauh’s model by
viewing [0, 1] as the set of players, the quantities that firms can maintain as their
actions—elements in set P , and q˜ as a vector of summary statistics in Σ by taking
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s : R → R to satisfy one consumption-strict monotonicity. Clearly, it can also
be obtained naturally by ours by taking similar constructions but without other
constraints.
(2) The function s in Rauh [27] is defined by taking the composition of the uni-
variate vector functions s1, . . . , sm with projections proj1, . . . , projm. Let C be the
range of s. It is obviously contained in the set Σ, which is the product of the
intervals between the minimum and maximum of the functions srq as in Rauh [27].
In our paper, we define s as any continuous function,5 and target space Σ as any
convex and compact subset of Rn, which contains C, and also contains that Σ
defined in Rauh [27]. Thus both the model and the main theorem in Rauh [27] are
special cases of ours.
(3) The action set P is often set to be a subset of Euclidean space. So a nat-
ural question arises whether the action set can be a generic compact metric space.
Our theorem gives an affirmative answer. Note that the action space in our model
can be infinite dimensional. For example, we can take P = M(A), the space of
probability measures on A endowed with the weak topology, where A is an infinite
subset of an Euclidean space. We also consider another more specific example. Let
the firms’ payoffs depend on their own quantities (which are belonging to R) along
the time and the summary statistics of the society. We formulate it as follows. We
assume time set to be [0, T ]. A continuum of firms [0, 1] take actions from action
set P , where P is taken to be a bounded closed subset of L∞([0, T ],R) with topol-
ogy σ(L∞([0, T ],R), L1([0, T ],R)). Note that P is compact by Alaoglu Theorem.
Let D be an upper bound for P . Let s : P → Rn be a projection at n epoches:
for f ∈ P , s(f) = (f(τ1), . . . , f(τn)), where (τ1, . . . , τn) are n fixed sampling times.
5The type of assumption on the strict monotonicity of the functions sr1 as in Rauh [27] is not
needed in our case.
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The set of summary statistics Σ can be taken as [0, D]n. The payoff function for
a firm is a real-valued continuous function defined on P × Σ. Then, following our
main model and theorem, we can claim the existence of Nash equilibrium in this
example.
(4) The target space can only be finite-dimensional in general.6 We now show
that our model can adopt the target space to be any separable Banach space by
choosing an atomless hyperfinite Loeb measure space (I, I, λ) as the space of play-
ers.7 We will reserve all other notations discussed above except that Σ can be a
weakly compact and convex subset of a separable Banach space(X, ‖ ·‖) with weak
topology instead of a subset of Rn. Moreover, we see s as a weakly continuous func-
tion from P onto a weakly compact subset C of a separable Banach space(X, ‖ ·‖).
Our main theorem is still valid in this setting when the integral in the definition
of σf is the Bochner integral. To prove this result, we can simply use Theorems 1
and 6 in Sun [30] to claim the convexity and upper semicontinuity as in (b) and
(c) above; we can then use the Fan-Glicksberg fixed point theorem instead of the
Kakutani fixed-point theorem to prove the existence of Nash equilibrium.
6For instance, we just assume that I is the closed unit interval with Lebesgue measure, then
an equilibrium may not exist as shown in Khan, Rath and Sun [13] and Rath, Sun and Yamashige
[25].
7See the theory of correspondences on Loeb spaces developed in Sun [30].
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